During the Peloponnesian War, as powerful Athens prepared to put the independent-minded, but tiny, island of Melos to the sword, the Melians appealed to principles of honor and fair play in a bid to save themselves.

The Athenians scoffed, noting that "the strong do as they will and the weak suffer as they must." And suffer the Melians did -- alone and unassisted.

Georgia is a latter-day Melos. It has been battered by Russia's over-the-top reaction to what began as a shoot-out between Georgian troops and forces belonging to the Russian-supported breakaway territory of South Ossetia and segued into a clash between Russian and Georgian military units.

Even if one accepts the Russian version in its entirety, the severity of Moscow's response was both unnecessary and unjustified. The United States and its European allies are indignant over the Kremlin's conduct. But, simply put, they will not do anything that truly makes Russia feel pain.

The reasons for patience and for taking the long view are already being offered: There are too many important issues on which Russia's cooperation is critical, pushing it into a corner will only strengthen its authoritarianism and bellicosity, the better course is to practice patient diplomacy... and so on.

The proposals now being proffered by pundits to arm Georgia, to boycott the 2014 Winter Olympics that will be held in Russia's Black Sea resort of Sochi, and to evict Russia from the Group of 8 will have no takers. Such measures may have been applied in an ideal world; they won't in the real one. This is unfair to Georgia, which is the victim; but it is nevertheless the reality.

Another unpalatable truth is that Russia's behavior in this instance is the norm, not the exception: Great powers impose their will on weaker neighbors and limit their freedom of action -- all the time.

Airy discourses about the commerce-driven dynamics of globalization and new norms of international conduct will not vanquish realpolitik. Just as other powerful states have done, Russia will be persistent in preventing weak neighbors that it considers to be part of its legitimate sphere of influence from forging links with its adversaries; the means used will vary, but not the ends. In today's Russia, Vladimir Putin personifies this policy, but it reflects deeper realities rooted in balance of power politics.

In this crisis, America and Europe have also behaved as states invariably have: They do not want to spend blood and treasure when the risks are too high and vital interests are not involved. In this instance, no state within NATO wants to pick a fight with Russia right on its doorstep. Nor do they wish to offer Georgia a guarantee of future protection.

The prevailing view seems to be that Russia's full-bore attack on Georgia increases Georgia's chance to gain entry into NATO; the reverse is more likely to be the case. NATO, as seem at its Bucharest summit meeting earlier this year, is already divided on Georgia's membership, and the discord is apt to deepen now that the implications of including it in the alliance are clear. Russia's attack on Georgia also illustrates how little gratitude matters in the politics among nations and how easily it is trumped by the dictates of power.

When Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, sent troops to Iraq, and was hailed as a steadfast democratic ally by President George W. Bush, he no doubt expected to win some good will that could be redeemed in an hour of need. Perhaps he believed that the United States would mobilize its allies and admonish Russia if it were to attack Georgia -- perhaps even offer tangible assistance.

If so, he miscalculated, and the United States is culpable for not making it clear that its thanks would not translate into tanks.

This crisis also tells us something - and it's not reassuring -- about the efficacy of international organizations when it comes to handling aggression. Some observers have looked to the United Nations to do right by Georgia. But what does that mean exactly? The UN can no more check Russia than it could block the Bush administration's preventive war against Iraq.

That Washington lacked a UN mandate and was criticized by most of its members mattered little to the White House. The same is true of the Kremlin; it will continue to debate its critics in the Security Council, and joined by its ally, China, will veto any resolution that condemns Russia.

In short, what happens in the UN will make for good theater: There have been, and will be, pious declarations, angry denunciations and sanctimonious finger-pointing. But none of this will help Georgia's fundamental problem, which is the disparity between its power and Russia's, and Moscow's determination to press that advantage to define what Georgia can and cannot do.

Utterly unsentimental and thoroughly cynical, Putin understands the arithmetic of power. In attacking a small and weak state located across Russia's border he did not take any big risks; and he bet that the West wouldn't either.

Bush did not look deeply enough into the Russian prime minister's soul -- and he apparently hadn't read his Thucydides in awhile.